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Abstract
We argue by using Godel's incompletness theorems in logic that platonism is the best metaphysics for 
science.  This is based on the fact that a natural law in a platonic metaphysics represents a timeless order
in the motion of matter, while a natural law in a materialistic metaphysics can be only defined as a 
temporary order which appears at random in the chaotic motion of matter.  Although a logical 
possibility, one can argue that this type of metaphysics is highly implausible. Given that mathematics fits 
naturally within platonism, we conclude that a platonic metaphysics is more preferable than a 
materialistic metaphysics.
1. Introduction
Many physicists beleive in a materialistic metaphysics, which means that the basic elements of the 
reality are space, time, elementary particles  (in the case of string theory, one can replace the 
elementary particles with strings)  and the corresponding fields. There is also a finite set of 
dynamical laws which describe the motion of the elementary particles and the fields. These laws 
can be expressed mathematically, so that one arrives at a mathematical theory of everything 
(TOE). String theory is the famous example of such a metaphysics. On the other hand, many 
mathematicans are platonists,  which means that they beleive that the mathematical ideas are 
eternal truths, which exist outside of space and time. Since all known physics laws can be 
described by mathematics, then it is plausible to propose a platonic metaphysics where our 
universe is the same object as the mathematical structure of the ultimate TOE [1]. This is the 
modern-day version of the pythagorean doctrine that all things are numbers. 
Tegmark's mathematical universe metaphysics proposed in [1] was criticised in [2], where it was 
argued that the concept of passage of time is inherently non-mathematical. Hence a platonic 
metaphysics has to include the idea of time flow in order to better describe the reality. The basic 
idea of  [2] is that our universe is a block universe, containing both mathematical and non-
mathematical structures, with a moving three-dimensional Cauchy surface (a burning block 
universe). This Cauchy surface splits the block universe into the past,  the present and the future.   
A block universe without the time flow is simply an abstract object in the platonic realm of ideas.   
Any TOE one can write down represents an object of this type.  A real universe is a mathematical 
structure in time. Hence a temporal platonic metaphysics can serve as a good metaphysics for 
explaining both mathematics and physics. 
However, there is an obstruction to the TOE concept, which comes from the Goedel's 
incompletness theorems (GIT) in logic, see [3]. The first incompletness theorem states that a finite 
or recursive logical system, which includes arithmetics, has a finite demonstrational power. More 
precisely, one can construct an undecidable statement (the Godel statement) which can not be 
proven to be true or false by using the postulates of the theory. Furthermore, the Godel statement 
can be taken to be true and therefore can be added to the initial set of the postulates. In the  new 
theory there will also exist a Godel statement, and so on, ad infinitum. If we apply this theorem to 
a TOE, it means that there will exist statements, i.e. physical phenomena, that cannot be explained 
within this theory. The first person to point out this was S. Jaki [2] in the 60's, and later it was also 
discussed by S. Hawking [3]. Although GIT prevent the existence of  a TOE, the concept of a TOE is 
still useful, since one would like to have a mathematical theory which describes a sufficiently large 
number of physical phenomena. In modern physics this is reflected by the ongoing effort to find a 
mathematical theory which unifies Quantum Mechanics and General Relativity and explains the 
Standard Model parameters.
The second theorem is more technical, and states that a consistent theory T cannot have a 
statement referring to the consistency of T. It serves to stregthen the first theorem, since a Godel 
statement does not refer to the consistency of the theory T, see [3].
There is another consequence of GITs that we would like to elaborate here. We will argue that GITs 
favor a platonic metaphysics. 
2. Metaphysics and the laws of Nature
A law of Nature can be easilly understood within a platonic metaphysics. It is a  postulate in a 
mathematical theory we use to describe the Nature. On the other hand, explaining the laws of 
Nature within a materialistic metaphysics, is more complicated. If one accepts that the natural laws
are different entities from space, time and  matter, and are irreducible, then for a materialist it 
does not seem to be a problem to add a finite set of such objects to his ontology.  In this case the 
natural laws are the postulates of a finite TOE. However, any TOE has to include the aritmethics, so 
that Goedel's theorems imply that there can not be a finite number of laws which completely 
explain the universe and one must introduce an infinite number of natural laws. This means that in
addition to space, time and matter, one has to introduce an infinite number of other entities, 
which are not reducible to space, time and matter, and hence one is back at platonism. 
In order to avoid introducing an infinite number of non-material entities in a materialistic 
metaphysics, one then has to give up the idea of a natural law as a mathematical concept (i.e. a 
postulate in a mathematical theory). Then the only explanation for a natural law in a materialistic 
metaphysics  is  that a natural law represents a regular pattern which appears in the fundamentaly 
chaotic motion of matter.  This regularity appears at random and lasts for a very long time. In this 
case one accepts the view that at the fundamental level there is no order and the particle 
trajectories and field configurations are completely arbitrary. This doctrine is a logical possibility, 
but it is highly implausible. The standard example for this type of implausibility  is to find a string of
letters in a random sequence of letters which corresponds to a well-known novel; or to construct a 
functioning airplane by using a tornado passing through a junk yard. Also, if the natural laws are 
finite-duration random regularities, then  the Earth can stop orbiting the Sun  tomorrow, which 
means  that our reality can disintegrate at anytime in the future. 
Another problem in a materialistic metaphysics is how an observer will recognize a natural law 
given that the ideas of order do not exist.  This is also a problem in a platonic metaphysics, see [6], 
but it is a less severe problem,  because the basic elements from which one can construct a 
solution already exist, see [2] for a possible solution.
3. Conclusions
Since in the spirit of science is the belief that the natural laws can be described by mathematics, 
than platonism is a natural metaphysics for science.  The natural laws must be mathematical, 
because by definition, a natural law must be expressible by a finite string of symbols obeying the 
laws of logic.  One can also have a natural law within a materialistic metaphysics, but its meaning is
completely different from the meaninig of a natural law in a platonic metaphysics.  While a natural 
law in a platonic metaphysics represents a timeless order in the motion of matter, in a materialistic
metaphysics a natural law is a temporary order  which appears in the chaotic motion of matter at 
random and lasts for a long time.  Although a logical possibility, one can argue that this scenario is 
highly implausible. Hence a platonic metaphysics is more plausible than a materialistic 
metaphysics.
A platonic metaphysics can also explain the famous Wigner observation about the unreasonable 
effectivnes of mathematics in science. Our universe can be thought of as a block universe 
containing the mathematical structures which represent the natural laws. However, the block-
universe picture is not complete without the idea of passage of time, which can be implemented 
by using a temporal platonic metaphysics [2].   Therefore a platonic metaphysics has a greater 
explanatory power than a materialistic metaphysics.
Another important feature of a platonic metaphysics is that the mathematical ideas alone are not 
sufficient to describe the real world.  For example, the idea of passage of time is not mathematical,
i.e. can not be completely described by a finite set of symbols, or in other words, by a finite text. It 
can be grasped only intuitively.  This also applies to other important non-mathematical ideas, such 
as conscioussnes and the idea of an observer.  Godel's theorems are consistent with the fact that 
we perceive certain abstract ideas as real,  although there is no formal definition or a proof of 
those.
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